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Abstract: I argue that the human being fits squarely within the natural world in Ar-
istotle’s anthropology. Like other natural beings, we strive to fulfill our end from the 
potential within us to achieve that end. Logos does not make human beings unnatural 
but makes us responsible for our actualization. As rational, the human can never be 
reduced to mere living animal but is always already concerned with living well; yet, 
as natural, she is not separated from the animal world, a dangerous distinction which 
inevitably leaves some persons reduced to mere animality.
The impulse to divide the human being from the rest of the natural world extends back to Greek mythology. Prometheus carves out a peculiar place for 
anthrôpoi (humans) between gods and animals by providing them with fire. By 
granting the human the unique capacity for making and creating—for chang-
ing—the world, Prometheus sets us apart from nature. From Plato to Descartes 
to Heidegger, western philosophy struggles to explain the naturalness of the 
human in light of her capacity for organizing and manipulating her world, often 
resulting in what Spinoza has called “a kingdom within a kingdom” of human 
beings within the animal world (Ethics III, Preface). Yet efforts to separate the hu-
man from what is natural have resulted in serious logical, ontological and ethical 
impasses. Assigning different principles for different spheres leads to dualism as 
well as incongruity within the community of men and women of the elements that 
are natural and those that are free. The practical result of this division has been 
that certain ‘natural’ humans who fail to qualify as ‘rational’ and hence, fall short 
of full humanity, are excluded, pronounced as merely natural and thereby denied 
political rights and protections. My argument in this paper considers Aristotle’s 
account of nature and reason to show that the human being cannot be reduced 
to something merely animal, mere body or bare life, yet at the same time arguing 
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that the human is the reason-using animal and hence is not separate from the 
principles of the natural animal world.
Two problematic veins of humanism are at work in considering our relation 
to the animal. On the one hand, when the human is considered in the ethical 
discourses of human rights, she is reduced to the animal where her basic rights 
are to her living animal body, to not be harmed, and so as victim, the human 
seeks to be protected at the level of her mere animality (and human rights are 
thus no different than animal rights).1 On the other hand, the equally human-
ist tendency to separate the human from the animal by the capacity for reason 
results in the division of human beings between those who have more reason 
and so are considered less animal and those who exhibit less reason and so are 
considered to be more animal, and therefore, less human. In what follows, I locate 
in Aristotle an account of the human being as both natural and rational where 
neither aspect is prioritized over the other. Such an account can challenge the 
political consequences that result from assigning a different set of principles to 
human beings based on reason.
Aristotle defines anthrôpos as the being, who, by nature, has logos.2 This 
definition appears paradoxical, since having logos, the human seems to function 
otherwise than according to physis (nature). Instead of moving steadily to her 
telos (end or fulfillment), as other natural things do unless impeded, the human, 
by making choices and allowing her telos to be a question to her, seems distinct 
from natural beings.3 But this distinction only holds when we conceive of physis 
as necessity or givenness rather than a source or principle of movement. Based 
on this latter, more Aristotelian, definition of physis, the conception of the human 
as natural is consistent with the rational capacity for choice. For Aristotle, we 
exist and act within the very same framework of physis in which animals oper-
ate. While the human appears to be the source of artifice for even that in which 
it thrives—the polis, for example—Aristotle casts physis, not in opposition to 
what can be otherwise, but as a way of being in movement toward an end. Such a 
conception makes nature and its end a question for politics instead of a prescrip-
tion for politics that might be used to exclude certain persons from political life.4
Consistent with the naturalness of the human, Aristotle considers the freedom 
that accompanies reason in terms of the capacity of the human to achieve her telos. 
According to nature, human beings strive toward their completion; according to 
reason, human beings determine what constitutes completion for them. Reason 
is the end and the fulfillment of being human and also the source that projects 
humans to their end. In this way, the human is shown to be free, but that freedom 
does not compromise her naturalness.
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Aristotle’s Conception of Nature
Designating human beings as natural appears problematic because we tend to 
equate nature with material, with what is given, with what remains the same 
through any change. Nature seems to dictate a constant certain path for natural 
things. The human appears to be outside of nature because she, through logos, 
or reasoned discourse, can act or become otherwise than what the process of 
nature prescribes. Logos seems to insert freedom and the capacity to be other-
wise into human existence, a state of affairs which would challenge what might 
be considered the necessity of nature.5 In order to understand how humans are 
natural, we need to re-examine both what Aristotle means by nature and how 
he conceives of freedom. Insofar as nature for Aristotle is an internal source of 
movement and logos is taken to be the end of human beings, logos is both what 
enables the human to achieve her end and its activity is the actualization of the 
human. Insofar as human beings achieve their end through this internal source 
that motivates them to actualize that end, the human is natural.
In this section, I consider the first part of this argument: Aristotle’s definition 
of nature. At Physics II.1, Aristotle defines nature as the archē or source of change 
within a thing that motivates it to actualize its end. Three points about Aristotle’s 
definition of nature will lay the groundwork for understanding the naturalness of 
anthrôpos. First and most fundamentally, nature is an internal archē. Second, as 
an internal source (archē), what is by nature uniquely relates its archē to its telos 
in entelechia (fulfillment) (Phys. 193b9–11). Natural things hold themselves in 
their end, because physis is what Cornelius Castoriadis calls a “pushing-toward-
giving-itself-a-form.”6 Working from within themselves to become most fully 
what they are, natural things are self-organizing and ordering. Third, and closely 
related to the first two, the internal source of natural things is coincident with what 
they need to be in order to keep on being, the to ti ēn einai. In defining nature 
as an internal source, Aristotle is simultaneously defining nature as that which a 
thing must be in order to be, that is, with its essence. These apparently distinct 
definitions are two ways of understanding the same phenomenon.
On the first point, Aristotle differentiates things that exist by nature from all 
other things by the internal source (archē) natural things have for moving and 
remaining at rest (Phys. 192b13–14). Unlike unnatural things, natural things have 
an impulse to change rooted in their nature (emphuton) (Phys. 192b19).7 Moreover, 
this source of change is not incidental to what they are, but fundamental to their 
being (Phys. 192b22–23).
Archē here must be understood as the source of a thing being what it is. In 
Metaphysics E, Aristotle explains that we are looking for the causes of things 
that are and of these, qua being what they are, rather than incidentally (Meta. 
1025b1–2). He elaborates, saying that the study of natural things is of the kind 
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of being (ousia) that has the source of its movement within itself (1025b20–21). 
The inquiry proceeds by considering what best qualifies for the archē that makes 
a thing what it is. Thus, for natural things, we consider what it is in them that 
moves them, not incidentally, but according to what they are. What we seek is not 
a rule that these things follow, as if the archē were a natural law or a concept that 
gathers all things of this kind, but what Sean Kelsey calls the authority within a 
thing that governs it.8 The archē is the source that directs a thing to be what it is; 
in natural things, such a thing is governing it from within.
As the internal source that governs from within, physis describes a particular 
way in which a thing is related to its end, specifically in entelechia, holding-
itself-in-its-end. Physis manifests a natural thing in the world from out of itself, 
organizing and originating itself according to its end. Aristotle describes the dif-
ference between technē-governed things and physis-governed things by the way 
the archē of each is related to its telos. Doctoring, which is a technē, directs itself 
toward something outside of itself. Hence, the archē of the product of technē is 
outside of the product, aiming toward something other than itself. The archē of the 
things governed by physis is toward more physis. So doctoring aims toward health, 
but human beings toward fulfilling their end as human being. Aristotle writes:
Doctoring must start from the art, not lead to it. But it is not in this way that 
nature (in one sense) is related to nature (in the other). What grows qua grow-
ing grows from something into something. Into what then does it grow? Not 
into that from which it arose but into that to which it tends. The shape then 
is nature. (Physics 193b16–19)
In this passage, the relation of the archē to the telos in a natural thing is joined 
to the argument that the nature of a thing is what it is when it is complete. But 
the way in which the archē and telos are related tells us something about how a 
natural thing stands in relation to its own fulfillment. The natural thing stands 
in contrast to an artificial thing, whose archē ceases to be concerned or involved 
in the completion of the thing, severing itself from its archē in its completion as 
a product (ergon) outside of the archē. In a natural thing, the source of its being 
remains at work (where energeia can be literally translated as being-at-work9) in 
its fulfillment of its end, which Aristotle describes with the term entelechia, holding 
the end in itself. The natural thing continues to work on its becoming complete 
and maintaining its completeness, work that is motivated from within itself (from 
its internal archē). Even in generation, the movement that brings a natural thing 
into existence, the form that comes from the father, is not an external form that 
is imputed on an external object. In generation, the form that comes from the 
father becomes the form of the natural thing (Gen. Am. 734a2–15, 734b22–24). 
A sign of this is that the father’s form does not need to continue to govern the 
child’s form in order for that form to do the work of the form, as the form in the 
mind of the builder is at work in the building of the house until it is complete, 
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at which point it ceases to move toward its fulfillment. The child’s form, drawn 
from the father but not itself the father’s form, governs itself when joined with 
the maternal matter (Gen. Am. 716a5–7, 729a21–31, 729b13–14).
We can better see how the natural end is internal to a natural thing when 
we see that what makes a thing what it is—its nature—is its morphē or form, 
which is more than mere arrangement (rhythmos). It is natural things, things that 
have an internal source of movement, that have a nature. We should not take this 
apparent dual use of physis to mean that nature is sometimes understood as a 
source of movement in a thing by virtue of what it is and sometimes understood 
as that which makes a thing be what it is, but rather see that these two uses are 
different ways of speaking of the same thing focused around the way in which a 
natural thing is morphē more than anything else.
Morphē is that which, from within natural things, moves them toward more of 
themselves, as Aristotle concludes the passage quoted above. Morphē brings the 
natural thing to stand as what it is, in its fullest appearance (eidos). Not merely 
the arrangement of the material incidentally imputed on a thing, as we might 
suppose a sculptor to arrange material to make a statue, the morphē shapes and 
continues to shape a thing in its end. For this reason, Aristotle speaks of the end as 
morphē, where a thing is fulfilled by continuing to shape itself from within itself.
Things have a nature which have a principle of this kind (192b33), because 
this principle from within the thing is the internal form. Hence, in natural things, 
the form is the final cause and the form appears in doing the work that makes 
the natural thing appear as what it is, in its end, as Aristotle explains at Physics 
B.7.198a25–29. This unity of the morphē of a thing and the form’s work to achieve 
this end shows that the source of movement internal to a thing is also what makes 
it what it is. We will see in what follows how logos serves as this source of achieving 
one’s end, that which leads us to that end, as well as the end.
The Nature of the Human: Logos
In this section, I consider the second part of the argument: the sense in which 
the human being is rational and free while still governed by the same principles 
of nature that govern other animals. This sense of the human being requires 
us to understand Aristotle’s definition of the human as having logos. At Politics 
I.2, Aristotle argues that a human being is by nature (physei) a political animal 
(1253a3). He explains that the reason a human being is more political than any 
other animal is that we have logos which makes it possible for us to discern along-
side others what is beneficial and just (1253a14–18). In Nicomachean Ethics I.7, 
Aristotle determines the end of the human being according to the element that 
distinguishes us from other living things. While all living things are nutritive and 
growing, and all sentient things perceive, the human acts having logos (praktikē 
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tis tou logon echontos) (1098a5). The proper function of the human is according 
to this element that sets it apart from the animals (1098a7). The good of the hu-
man—the highest end of the human being—is the life lived according to logos 
(1098a12–16). Such an end is achieved by displaying the virtue appropriate to it 
(EN I.8.1098b32–1099a3).
As natural beings motivated toward our end by the source within that leads us 
to fulfill ourselves, we reach that end—rational activity—from within ourselves. 
The way the human accomplishes the life that amounts to happiness will be unique 
to each person, but achieved in each case by rational activity according to virtue. 
The end is given and so necessary, but what amounts to that end, what rational 
activity will mean and look like, will depend on the deliberations in which we 
engage in order to consider how to achieve happiness (EN 1095a19–21). The hu-
man being is stable in its projection toward an end, but variable regarding how 
to achieve that end, and which life so constitutes that end.
While logos is the natural end toward which we aim (EN 1098a3–9), it has 
the capacity, unlike other natural ends that are capable of only one effect, for 
contrary effects (Meta. IX.5.1048a7–8). A doctor, for example, can make a pa-
tient healthy or sick. Human beings are capable of choosing contrary to what is 
good for them because rational capacities are determined according to desire or 
choice (1048a10). In this way, it seems that logos is the cause of that which could 
be otherwise than it is.
Yet logos is still the internal source that forms us and remains in the work of 
leading us toward the end of living out of logos. While on the one hand, human 
beings can act contrarily to that which leads us to the end, we can also differently 
interpret what counts as the telos to which we aim. Aristotle writes at EN III.3 that 
we deliberate not about ends, but what leads to the end, which has been generally 
established to include either an instrumental or constitutive sense. The plural-
ity of lives that has led to the sense that ethical and political life is conventional 
because multiple is located in the ta pros ta telē (that which is toward the end) 
not in the telos. It is a matter of differently determining which life is the life that 
is according to logos.
A growing number of distinguished scholars maintain that deliberation’s 
concern, ta pros ta telē, includes more than means and should be translated as 
“what is toward the end.”10 These commentators have argued in various forms 
that Aristotle does not consider the specification of the end as a distinct activ-
ity from discerning the means, where the virtuous person deliberates about the 
particular situation, but always with a view to the good life in general which 
requires consideration of what that life is. What this interpretation of the task of 
deliberation shows is that the human being, while functioning within the same 
principles of natural life, takes as an issue for herself what life would satisfy her 
end. So, since logos is required for achieving the end, and deliberation is that 
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manifestation of logos and since it is a matter of determining how to achieve that 
end, we as human beings take up the question of what counts as the end just as 
much as what we will do to achieve it.
Choice and Nature: Rational Contraries and the End
Having situated logos firmly within the natural relation of the archē to the telos 
in human beings, we have seen how choice (prohairesis) is the archē of action in 
such a way that this action remains natural. Choice appears to present a problem 
for this unified account of the human within nature because choice, which adds 
reason to desire, seems to make the human being free in a way that stands in 
contrast to natural things, which certainly act according to desire, but not reason. 
Yet this relation we have to our end makes reasoned discourse both our natural 
end and the capacity we have for choice in relation to that end, and choice is what 
we generally take to be the basis of the freedom that characterizes being human. 
Choice in relation to our end appears to make us other than natural because it is 
the capacity to be otherwise. But we do not thereby find a separate and distinct 
structure for action in human beings. While other natural things fulfill their end 
unless something external intervenes, persons can intervene in their own attempt 
to fulfill their end.
Since the rational capacity is for contraries, as Aristotle tells us (Meta. 
1046b2–4), the “good” actuality is not necessitated or predictable by the presence 
of the potential. The rational capacity itself in the human being can know con-
traries and lead to contraries, but it is not evident that it can lead to the contrary 
of itself within human beings. Notably, reason is the natural capacity in human 
beings, the source of being human in human beings. Our rational potential does 
involve some capacity for determining our end insofar as through it we work to 
determine what it means to be rational, but it does not include the capacity to 
be other than rational.
From Aristotle’s examples in the passage that describes rational potentiality as 
of contraries—“the hot is capable only of heating, but the medical art can produce 
both disease and health” (Meta. 1046b5–7)—we note that the difference between 
non-rational potential is that there is no need to discern what the proper end for 
the situation would be. What is capable of heating cannot cool, at least not as that 
which is capable of heating. But what is capable of healing must in the situation 
before it determine first what the end is and then consider how to reach that end. 
We can see here explicitly how rational capacities require a consideration of the 
end as much as the means to achieve that end.
Aristotle tries to make sense of persons who appear to pursue an end that is 
not good in the context of wishing. He argues that what is wished for that is not 
well-selected is not wished for at all since what is wished for is what is good and 
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an ill-selected thing would be bad (EN 1113a18–20). But Aristotle denies that 
each person pursues only the apparent good, making the person who is of seri-
ous moral stature the measure of what is to be wished for (1113a26). Someone 
whose perception of what is good has been corrupted by pleasure has a distorted 
view of what she pursues, but she is not thereby less rational or less responsible 
for the pursuit of what she pursues, as if that pleasure has made her an animal. 
Rather, as Aristotle explains, such a person is responsible for having become the 
sort of person who wishes for what is not good, for what does not lead her to the 
end (1113b6, 1114a3–7, 1114b30–1115a3). At the heart of this argument is that 
human beings, unlike other animals, are responsible for becoming incapable of 
achieving their end or of judging poorly regarding what constitutes that end. It is 
in this sense that human beings have a capacity for contraries, but this capacity 
does not make them other than rational. We must not suppose that there is an 
animal existence that at some point becomes human by using reason. Rather, being 
human always involves using reason and the development of it. We use reason to 
fulfill our end as oak trees use their capacity to be oak trees to fulfill their end as 
oak trees. While nonrational potentialities are like those of the animals, for pursu-
ing pleasure and avoiding pain, rational potentialities make it possible for us to 
perceive these things in light of the further intellection of what is good for us so 
that we weigh pleasures and pains according to what we deem good. The rational 
potentialities first consider what constitutes the end (What is health? What does 
health look like in this situation? What is eudaimonia? What would eudaimonia 
look like in this situation?), and then which action would lead to that end.
In this way, the potential for contraries at work in rational potentialities does 
not remove us from the structure of natural internal movement toward an end. The 
rational contraries show that we could have chosen otherwise because we could 
have taken this situation to call for some other opposite action, but we judged it 
to be this situation. On that basis, we rationally directed our desire toward action. 
Yet insofar as natural movement is driven by an internal principle toward an end 
from the potentiality for that end, human beings as much as acorns are natural.
The capacity for deliberation is the virtue whereby we consider what consti-
tutes the end. As Aristotle writes at Physics II.3.195a21–22, “But the seed and the 
doctor and the deliberator, and generally the maker, are all sources whence the 
change or stationariness originates.”11 The deliberator is the source of an action, 
but not as the doctor is—external to the object of health—but as internal, the 
source of the action and the actor herself. This choice and its resulting action, 
which are both a result of habit and a producer of habit, constitute the character 
of the actor. This character and the choices that follow from it signal the end the 
actor counts as eudaimonia.
Aristotle acknowledges the disagreement over what counts as eudaimonia 
at Nicomachean Ethics I.4. We generally identify living well and doing well with 
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eudaimonia, but we disagree regarding what counts as living well (peri de tēs eu-
daimonias, ti estin). The many tend to think it is a life of pleasure, and the wise, a 
life according to reason (EN I.4.1095a19–24). By Nicomachean Ethics I.7, Aristotle 
has shown that the life according to reason is the life that achieves eudaimonia, but 
it remains in question what will constitute that life. In Politics VII.3–4, Aristotle 
considers the political life and the philosophical life as candidates for that life and 
there concludes (in contrast to his conclusions in Nicomachean Ethics X.6–8) that 
both lives are worthy candidates for living well. Yet even here, the virtuous person 
must continue to consider what would count as the best life in politics for that 
person and what the best philosophical life would look like. One can easily see the 
different manifestations of political life and that deliberation is required to judge 
which would be best: a political life might be in elected office, in a think tank, as 
a community organizer, or even within the academy; a philosophical life might 
be supported by family wealth, academic institutions, or pursued in retirement. 
Aristotle acknowledges that the outline that his Ethics offers is not sufficient for 
showing individual persons how to live their lives (EN 1094b12ff.). Deliberation 
(bouleusis) and practical wisdom (phronēsis) must be at work in each life in order 
to determine how that life will be manifested.
Choice and Nature: Particular Actions in Animals and Humans
Reason as our natural end, we are coming to see, positions us firmly within the 
structure of the natural world even as it grants us the capacity to be otherwise 
than we are. In this section, I explain how choice works in particular actions to 
show how humans act within the same structure that animals do. Just as it is so 
for the animals, human action follows from a desire for an end that leads to action 
when the desire is accompanied by the perception of a situation as one which will 
achieve the goal to which the desire aims (EN 1112b12–19, 1113a10–13). In sum, 
as recent commentators on the de Anima and de Motu Animalium from Charles 
Kahn to Martha Nussbaum have shown, human beings, as both embodied and 
rational, join judgment to their perceptions, so that perception aids in judgment 
as judgment always accompanies perception, and that this is true of animals as 
well.12 Sentient beings generally engage in some form of judgment of their percep-
tions. Judgment and determination of what we perceive does not set us outside 
the animal kingdom. There is considerable debate concerning which faculty is at 
work when human beings perceive the world in order to make ethical choices,13 
but there appears to be agreement that both animals and humans act out of the 
coupling of desire with some sort of discernment of the world that leads us to 
judge what action would achieve the posited end. Whether through aisthēsis or 
phantasia,14 animals, like humans in deliberation, consider the world selectively 
in light of their goals and ends: for animals, what is pleasant and for human be-
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ings, what is good. Both act in relation to their end, propelled by desire for that 
end and perception of the world in terms of that end.
Such perception that sees in the world what is required of the virtuous person 
seems precisely what phronēsis is for Aristotle. Aristotle notes that Pericles and 
similar men were considered phronēmoi because they could see (dunatai theōrein) 
what was good for themselves and for everyone in general (EN 1140b9). Phronēsis, 
like perception, is of particulars and of external things not the universals in the 
soul (De Anima II.5.417b19–27, see also EN VI.9.1142a14, 1142a25–27). Phronēsis 
requires seeing what the situation is and judging what is good in light of one’s 
character. Aristotle remarks that while it is true that all aim at the apparent good, 
the end appears to each according to her character and we are responsible for 
having become such a character (one who cannot perceive what is good but only 
what seems good to a poorly developed character) (EN 1114a32). We learn from 
this treatment of phronēsis that while not everyone is phronetic, we do all perceive 
the world in terms of what we take to be good and what we judge to be the right 
action to achieve our end within a given situation.
Phronēsis is a way of seeing the situation in light of the good life. This percep-
tion is needed by those who must deliberate, and this perception is corrupted, 
Aristotle tells us, by pleasure and pain, which make the goal no longer appear as a 
motivating principle (1140b16–17). When pleasure and pain affect the actor, she 
no longer sees the situation as one that calls for this particular action for the sake 
of and because of this end. Deliberation as the thinking involved in determining 
how one ought to act requires seeing the situation through phronēsis as well as 
determining what would constitute good living in the current circumstances 
and actions. Hence, deliberation is the principle in the actor in the same way that 
aisthēsis or phantasia is the principle in animals. That they are different in the 
respect of the end does not change the structure of action for the human being.
This view of action shows that Aristotle offers one unified account of action 
that applies to animals and human beings based on seeing that involves judging 
in relation to an end coupled with desire. Against the view that Aristotle offers a 
simple account of action that applies to all animals and a more complex account 
that applies only to human action, Nussbaum argues that the simple account 
makes room for the complex account so that deliberative desire has an animal 
basis for the ethical attitudes and practices from which it follows.15 A distinction 
drawn between the account for voluntary action and responsible action supposes 
that a child makes some mysterious shift from voluntary to responsible action, 
from acting from an internal principle to acting according to decision. But there 
need not be such a mysterious shift where we can easily understand a develop-
ment from perception to intellection.
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Choice Without Will: Power as Freedom
In the beginning of this paper, I said we needed to re–examine what Aristotle 
means by nature and what he means by freedom. We have examined Aristotle’s 
notion of nature and how human rationality fits into that account, and I will 
now turn, before closing, to an examination of freedom in Aristotle. The rational 
contrary structure might lead us to assume an underlying will that affirms or 
denies. Yet we must understand the rational capacity in terms of a potential striv-
ing to actuality rather than as an underlying thing between desire and reason 
that functions like the will and directs a person to follow reason or desire. Such 
a strong distinction between reason and desire appears in Plato, in the Republic, 
for example, yet Aristotle does not oppose these capacities, but aligns them to 
achieve our end.
The part of the soul marked by desire falls under the sway of reason in the 
development of character. We form our character through activity and we must 
continue to act in a certain way in order to be able to act in that way. The capacity 
to choose well follows when we have directed our desires toward what we take 
to be good for us accompanied by the ongoing work of deliberation for discern-
ing how to achieve those ends through the actions that are possible for us. No 
underlying will makes our activity possible; only our previous activity that has 
formed a character capable of acting according to what will fulfill us makes our 
continued activity in that vein possible.
This internal principle of action presents freedom as more akin to power 
than to the will. There is choice, but choice that follows from deliberation.16 The 
object of choice is of “things that might be brought about by our own efforts” (EN 
1112b26–28, cf. 1112a31, 1112a36–37). When Aristotle speaks of voluntary action 
as according to an internal source of movement he explains it in terms of power:
Now the man acts [prattei] voluntarily [echon];17 for the principle that moves 
[te archē tou kinein] the instrumental parts of the body in such actions [prax-
esin] is in him, and the things of which the moving principle [tē archē] is in 
a man himself are in his power to do or not to do [ep’ autō kai to prattein kai 
mē]. (EN III.1.1110a15–18)18
This last phrase while translated as “power to do or not do” does not include 
the typical Greek terms for power (kratos or dunamis). While Ross translates it in 
this way (as do Ostwald and Rackham), translating the phrase more literally as 
“to act or not to act from out of oneself ” brings to the fore the sense of internal 
principle involved in voluntary action. An action is done voluntarily if the action 
originated with the actor, if she exhibits the power for it. And the determination 
of an action is based on what one is capable of accomplishing (see 1141b20–25).19
Conceiving freedom as power rather than will allows us to see the human as 
free insofar as she is empowered to fulfill her end. That we can fall short of fulfill-
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ing our end because we can fail to flourish (when in choosing that which leads 
us to our end we misconstrue what constitutes eudaimonia and how to achieve 
it) shows that we, as human, are responsible for our end in a unique way. Indeed, 
the notion that the human can be unfree, while plants and animals cannot be, 
further suggests that we need the power to determine our end in order to fulfill 
it. In this way, we act freely. We are still using our potential for reason to reach 
our rational end, and so we remain firmly within the natural world. This sense 
of freedom is in my view more consistent with Aristotle’s ethical philosophy and 
suggests freedom as power or what Arendt calls virtuosity.20
Freedom as power that arises from an internal principle is not a given essence 
but a developed capacity, and as a developed capacity affects one’s power to 
continue to act (EN I.1.1110a17, 1111b25–26, 30, 1112a31–12b4). This internal 
principle is not the will, the site of freedom for Augustine and Descartes, but a 
capacity developed through habituation both to deliberate and to act on the choice 
made as a result of deliberation (EN 1113a3–4). Action, for Aristotle, produces 
the capacity for more activity by developing character, and thereby increases the 
power to live a virtuous life (1103b21–25, 1104a26–04b2). This interplay between 
the potential and its actualization is found in the freedom of the individual and 
mirrored in the freedom of the polis: both move from an internal principle to 
develop habits (or institutions) that increase the potential for further activities, 
and yet are not determined or necessitated by those habits or institutions.
Choice and freedom in Aristotle should be understood in terms of power and 
the archē internal to me that prompts my actions. Nature and reason are unified, 
on this account, in so far as deliberation works in the human according to na-
ture—an internal principle of change that drives us to fulfill our end of logos from 
out of logos. Just as the natural being is natural because the principle by which 
she fulfills her end is internal to her, so the human being is natural because her 
rational end is fulfilled by her potential for reason and language.21 The freedom 
to develop contrary actualities—the rational capacity for contraries—enables 
me to become the character that fulfills my end. Yet even in this freedom, I am 
not free to be otherwise than aiming myself toward my end of rational activity 
nor do I move toward that end (even where I go wrong) outside of my rational 
capacities to achieve the end.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued from Aristotle that anthrôpos for him is firmly situated 
within the natural world. Physis—the internal principle of nature—governs the 
human in the same way it governs natural things. As in all natural things, human 
beings aim to fulfill their end. We are the animals whose fulfillment consists in 
having logos. Furthermore, like animals, human beings act by perceiving a situ-
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ation as one in which our end will be achieved, and then we act in because we 
desire to achieve that end. This structure is the same as that whereby animals act; 
the difference revolves around what is included in our perception—judgment in 
perception for animals, judgment in reason for us. Deliberation is the work of 
discerning what the situation is and what it calls for.
The distinctiveness of the human is in its relation to its end, but this distinc-
tiveness does not make it unnatural. The human unlike other natural things keeps 
the problem of fulfilling its end before it; the task of reaching its end perdures 
as a concern. The end of the human being is the active use of logos, but what it 
means to fulfill that end is not given. A person develops a character according to 
her conception of what constitutes that end, but that character too is not given 
and leads to certain kinds of action, but could lead to others. When situations 
that have not been encountered before are presented, we return to the question 
of what counts as eudaimonia and what that means in the situation before us.
My argument shows how Aristotle’s principle of nature governs the human 
being as it does other natural things. Such a case furthers Aristotle’s insistence 
on the unity of the natural world, especially the unity of principles of perishable 
living things in the natural world. By affirming this unity, Aristotle denies that 
there is a subset of natural entities that operate by principles other than those 
that govern the rest of nature. Within this unified science, wherein the definition 
of the genus applies equally to all members, Aristotle does not present different 
principles for beings with rational souls and beings with sentient souls. The souls 
have different capacities, but the principles of organization and of becoming 
govern all natural perishable beings in the same way. The political significance 
of this argument is important. This account of the human being prevents us from 
constituting political life as the division between those who transcend nature 
and those who do not, thereby excluding from political life those who are more 
associated with the natural world. In Aristotle’s account, even political life is a 
natural phenomenon of human life. Living rationally is the natural end toward 
which we strive.
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